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not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged publicly.” More along these lines
would perhaps reveal that policy makers
have quite a bit more flexibility in responding to overseas events and that
covert action is not the only option between inaction and the overt use of
force. But this is a mere quibble.
In sum, Lowenthal has written an outstanding primer on intelligence, the intelligence process, and the intelligence
community.
W. H. DALTON

Department of Defense
Associate Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence
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Finally, an author has done a hardhitting analysis of the USS Pueblo incident of January 1968. Mitchell B. Lerner,
an assistant professor of history at Ohio
State University, does not exonerate the
commanding officer of the Pueblo, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, for giving up
the ship and crew, and the intelligence it
had gathered. However, of all those who
may have been culpable, Commander
Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer
the scapegoat his superiors made him
out to be. Exhaustive research, including
access to new information released from
the Lyndon Johnson White House files,
leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the
shoulders of the Navy chain of command,
the intelligence community, and Johnson’s
foreign policy advisors, due to their misunderstanding and underestimation of
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the North Korean–Soviet Union
relationship.
Lerner asserts that the intelligence collection effort, code-named Operation
CLICKBEETLE, was the idea of the National Security Agency and that it had
been patterned after the efforts of the
Soviet Union’s intelligence-collection
ships (AGIs) off the coast of the United
States. Deciding that the Navy should be
the operational commander for this strategic tasking, the National Security
Agency turned the program over to it.
Converting tired, old, and slow cargo
ships into intelligence collection platforms with insufficient money, inadequate self-defense, little more than fresh
coats of paint, minimal training, and inadequate safeguards for the sensitive intelligence equipment on board, the Navy
mismanaged the effort from the outset.
The maladies that befell the USS Liberty
in 1967 off the coast of Israel were repeated in the preparation and tasking of
Pueblo just seven months later off the
Korean Peninsula.
The USS Pueblo had been tasked to collect
signals intelligence in the Sea of Japan using the “cover” of conducting hydrographic research. The operation had been
deemed to be of minimal risk, based on
the analogy of the Soviet AGIs. Lerner
contends that whenever an AGI violated
territorial waters, the U.S. Navy would
turn it around with an admonishment
and no more. Would not the North Koreans do the same? Herein rested the
Navy’s greatest miscalculation. The Koreans were not the puppets of the Soviet
Union or its foreign policy executors.
Lerner goes to great lengths to take the
reader inside the mind of Kim Il Sung
and his vision of communism and the
greater glory of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
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Shortly after the operation got under
way, the North Korean navy reacted
with surprise and precision. Commander Bucher, armed only with a few
.50-caliber machine guns aboard his
slow vessel, surrendered the Pueblo after
stalling his pursuers for only sixty-five
minutes. Inadequate destruction equipment and too much unnecessary classified material on board led to an
intelligence coup for North Korea. One
U. S. sailor lost his life during the short
resistance. The defensive cover that was
to have been provided by the Navy and
the Air Force in response to calls from
the Pueblo never came. The Navy and
the Johnson administration missed all
the indications and warnings that such a
fate could befall the Pueblo, even after
recognizing that the Pyongyang regime
had violated the demilitarized zone more
than fifty times, ambushed U.S and allied ground forces, attempted to assassinate the president of the Republic of
Korea (with a secondary target to be the
American embassy), and in the preceding nine months seized twenty South
Korean fishing vessels for “entering
North Korean territorial waters.”
Lerner then brings the reader briefly into
the brutal interrogation rooms of the
communist regime and the elevenmonth negotiations that finally resulted
in the release of the crew in December
1968. Kim Il Sung used the captured vessel and its crew to further his domestic
agenda and drive for greater nationalism. His negotiators remained steadfast
in their demands that the United States
admit that the Pueblo had violated North
Korea’s territorial waters—it had not—
and that the American government
apologize to the citizens of North Korea
and assure Kim Il Sung that the violations would never happen again.
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Meanwhile, President Johnson could not
negotiate the return of the crew without
considering a host of broader international considerations, most notably the
war in Vietnam. Lerner concisely weaves
together the competing national foreign
policy objectives to ensure that South
Korea remained an active ally in South
Vietnam while simultaneously keeping the
United States out of another conflict on
the Korean Peninsula.
While negotiations dragged on, there
was little interest from the American
public: the increasingly unpopular Vietnam War, the struggle for civil rights,
the campaign for the equal rights for
women, two political assassinations, and
the decision of the incumbent president
to forgo a second term all diverted the
attention of the American public and
relegated the Pueblo negotiations to the
back pages of the newspapers and in
most cases erased them altogether.
Lerner presents such a thorough explanation of the entire incident that it is
unnecessary to belabor here the findings
of the Navy’s court of inquiry. This important historical analysis provides the
reader with a better understanding of the
impact of seemingly harmless operations
on the conduct of foreign policy. More
importantly, the book demonstrates the
critical importance of intelligence collection, analysis of indications and warnings, and the effects that ignoring such
crucial information may have on not
only fighting forces but the nation’s
interests.
DANIEL J. BRENNOCK

Captain, U.S. Navy
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